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THE WRITTEN ORATOR 
OF "SONG OF MYSELF": 
A Recent Trend in Whitman Criticism 
MARK BAUERLEIN 
I. 
What living and buried speech is always vibrating here ... 
- Whitman, "Song of Myself' 
What drops of all the sea of our science are baled up! and by what accident it is that these are ex-
posed, when so many secrets sleep in nature! Hence the necessity of speech and song; hence 
these throbs and heart~beatings in the orator, at the door of the assembly, to the end namely 
that thought may be ejaculated as Logos, or Word. 
- Emerson, "The Poet" 
Through me forbidden voices, 
Voices of sexes and lusts .... voices veiled, and I remove the 
veil, 
Voices indecent by me clarified and transfigured . . . 
- Whitman, "Song of Myself' 
THE CRITICAL BELIEF that Whitman's poetry, specifically "Song of Myself," 
bespeaks an oratorical presence has persisted from Whitman's own time (fos-
tered mainly by Whitman himself!) down to the present day. To confirm the 
prevalence of an oracular, "bardic" interpretation one need only consult a 
comprehensive bibliography of Whitman criticism and count the number of 
times the word "voice" or its variants appear in the titles of entries. 2 Tradi-
tionally, most critics have argued for orality in Whitman either by examining 
his biography to show his sincere but unfulfilled intentions of buildini~ a 
career as a public speaker;3 or they have looked directly at the poetry to 
discover the rhetorical and stylistic patterns that bring to mind oral 
discourse.4 But recently some critics of "Song of Myself' have chosen to go 
beyond biographical and stylistic analyses alone to support their contentions 
for orality. In speaking of Whitman as the oracular poet, several critics in the 
last five years - notably John T. Irwin, Calvin Bedient, and C. Carroll 
Hollis5 - have used discourses outside the literary institution such as nuclear 
physics, analytic philosophy, and cultural anthropology. But notwithstand-
ing how diverse are the aims of these disciplines, they all have served to 
clarify Whitman's place in oral tradition. 
Whitman himself initiated the emphasis on speech in "Song of Myself' 
both inside and outside the poem. After publishing the volume, Whitman 
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wrote anonymous reviews of Leaves of Grass stressing its prophetic, vocal as-
pects. And within the poem itself, stylistic and thematic techniques are used 
to highlight speech. These latter have been amply commented upon6 and I 
will simply summarize them here. 
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I} Whitman explicitly exalts speech, often at the expense of writing-
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand .... 
nor look through the eyes of the dead. . . . nor feed on the 
spectres in books ... (1. 35)1 
This is the breath of laws and songs and behaviour, 
This is the tasteless water of souls. . . . this is the true 
sustenance, 
It is for the illiterate . . .8 
My voice goes after what my eyes cannot reach, 
With the twirl of my tongue I encompass worlds and volumes 
of worlds. 
Speech is the twin of'my vision .... it is unequal to measure 
itself. (11. 564-566) 
These passages indicate Whitman's trust in the unmediated power of 
speech. They also disclose his recognition that writing threatens this 
power. Because writing separates the author both from his own 
language and from his audience (who therefore "take things at second or 
third hand"), writing precludes an immediate communal ex-
perience - exactly what Whitman wants to inspire in his readers. 
Writing puts each reader into his own private study, and so the "truth" 
of "Song of Myself' becomes fragmented in solipsistic, idiosyncratic in-
terpretations beyond the author's control. To preserve and share the ex-
perience of "Song of Myself," Whitman must return to a speaker-
audience relation, where the "breath of laws and songs and behavior," 
under the auspices of the governing source of inspiration, can be passed 
between one another without corruption. Because speech springs up 
naturally and immediately from experience without prescription or 
regulation by technics or propriety (which, as conventional, can change 
through history), speech can make claims to universality. It "encom-
pass[es] volumes of worlds" (and books). It takes place with the fact 
while writing takes place after the fact, involving a reconstruction of 
and a separation from presence.9 Writing refers to a remembered p~st, 
speech inhabits a living present. Speech then becomes Whitman's ma-
jor tactical motifin "Song of Myself' that harmonizes and consolidates 
society into a unified "interpretive community." 
2) Whitman uses the simple present and imperative verb tenses-
I celebrate myself ... (1. 1) 
Clear and sweet is my soul ... (1. 52) 
Trippers and askers surround me ... (1. 66) 
Stop this day and night with me ... (1. 33) 
Hear now the tale of a jetblack sunrise ... 10 
Failing to fetch me at first keep encouraged ... (1. 1344) 
The simple present rejuvenates the act expressed every time a reader 
comes across it. The precise economy and bare assertiveness of the sim-
ple present give it an immediate impact that the present progressive or 
the simple past lacks. 
The imperatives, less commanding than assuringly inviting, enable 
Whitman to achieve the kind of attention-grabbing authority a skillful 
orator exercises upon his listeners. 
3) Whitman copiously employs rhetorical questions, anaphora, 
apostrophes, repetitions (in the catalogues and lists), parallelisms, and 
other structural techniques - all of which he would have learned from 
reading textbooks on rhetoric ll and are a common characteristic of oral 
poetry (see Bedient, p. 82)-and Anglo-Saxon and slang diction. As 
Whitman's career progressed, he inserted more poeticisms (mainly in-
versions and Latinate diction) in Leaves of Grass and withdrew much of 
the "language of the street," but the early editions bountifully contain 
slang words and the above-mentioned stylistic elements which enhance 
the poem's oracular spontaneity. 
The intended effect of these stylistic and thematic motifs is, of course, to 
make the reader feel (literally, if you will) the presence of Whitman and to 
force him (or at least coerce him) to respond accordingly. Speech offered 
Whitman a powerful incantatory pathway undeviatingly into the psyche of 
his individual readers for, in contrast with the alienating spectatorship of 
sight, "Only through the umbilicus mundi of dynamic sound could he re-
connect his audience with the pagan joy of being" (Bedient, p. 82). Sound 
raised to the level of the "hum" of the "valved voice," the "password 
primeval," reintegrates "old and young," "maternal as well as paternal," "the 
wicked just the same as the righteous," into a community of visionaries 
whose voices are lifted together in a "chant democratic." 
And so Whitman desires his readers to view him as the "bard" amal-
gamating society through the exhilarating attraction of inspired oration. He 
exhorts us to amplify these rhetorical strategies beyond the printed page, to 
affirm an oral presence in the work that transcends visual notations. How-
ever, one seemingly insurmountable problem remains: to assert anything 
more than a mimetic orality (in other words, a non-oral orality) in "Song of 
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Myself' or in poetry in general, a reader must ignore the fact that poetry ex-
ists for the most part onI y as signs on a page, not as a living aural presence. 
For the critic, the vocal origin of the lyric utterance can only be postulated as 
an ephemeral visionary moment withdrawn (spatially and temporally) 
behind a veil of written signs - "spectres," to Whitman - that separate as well 
as unite author and reader. Whether a critic prefers to project himself im-
aginatively back to the origin of creation, using the text as a lyrical map, so as 
emphathetically to share the spontaneous vision of the bard; or whether a 
critic prefers to de-mystify empathy (on both the poet's and the reader's part) 
by exposing the fallacy of overlooking mediation (as writing) depends upon 
his presuppositions. Admittedly, these are extremist positions that few 
critics and teachers ofliterature actually assume. The fundamental issue here 
is what becomes of the status of writing under the treatment of Whit man and 
his recent critics. What is at stake is the condition of writing as mediation and 
the possibility of an unmediated speech. 
Before bringing his discussion of mediation down to the level of lin-
guistic signs, John T. Irwin, in his chapter on Nietzsche and Whitman in 
American Hieroglyphics, first examines the idea of nature as mediation by op-
posing realist epistemology to phenomenalist epistemology. Realism argues 
for common sense assumptions about reality-things are as we perceive them 
and they have an existence apart from our perception of them. That is, things 
are self-evident and mediation (in the form of sensation) poses no threat to the 
steady correspondence of thought and reality. But what happens when one 
begins to raise thought to self-consciousness by actively doubting the trust-
worthiness of the senses along with the innocence of consciousness in appre-
hending reality? The result, as Irwin says, is a "characteristic separation such 
as presence-to-sight from presence-to-mind, the real from the ideal, the 
phenomenal from the noumenal" (p. 94), leaving man in a position of episte-
mological skepticism. In Emerson's famous aphorism, "The axis of vision is 
not coincident with the axis of things, and so they appear not transparent but 
opaque." To show the modern relevance of Emerson's statement, Irwin 
quotes a physicist, Steven Weinberg, 12 who claims that even anti-metaphys-
ical sciences like current theoretical physics must confront the metaphysical 
problem of appearance versus reality in trying to formulate a unified field 
theory. Like the literary critic, the physicist finds himself interpreting an 
essence (a force, a law, a theory that ppsits a universal explanation) that 
manifests itself only in a mediating, phenomenal world of appearances. 13 
The situation of the physicist reading the "Book of Nature" has its ana-
logue in the critic engaged in reading the poem. In the case of "Song of My-
self," the critic's "unified field theory" is the author whose coherent, ruling 
personality stabilizes and elucidates the poem by providing an ultimate 
referent for its meaning. But instead of a blank, mechanical set of atomic 
processes to theorize about, the reader of Whitman has a vibrant, congenial 
"brother" ready to offer interpretive guidance and even demand a sympa-
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thetic rejoinder. Whitman's concern to direct the reader's response is 
evidenced by open addresses scattered throughout the poem from the first 
section-"And what I assume you shall assume" (1. 2)-to the last-"I stop 
somewhere waiting for you" (1. 1346). But to assert his continued though 
benevolent authority over the reader, Whitman must inject his speaking 
presence into the poem, and so the problem becomes one of how to bypass 
the fallen, distancing written signifier, how to convince the reader that "this 
is no book; I Who touches this, touches a man. "14 
The idea that the book can become a coextension of Whitman's physical 
body which the reader can luxuriate in neatly accords with Irwin's thesis. He 
extends his hieroglyphic interpretation of "Song of Myself' by claiming that 
Whitman's desire for contact with the reader goes further than the avowal of 
presence in the form of speech. Whitman intends to use an even more imme-
diate, self-evident signification with which to gather in his readers in the mu-
t tual celebration not only of sonic but also of tactile experience. 
The kind ofimmediately convincing presence that Whitman has in mind is not the presence 
of a speaking voice but of a physical body ... Whitman's poems are intended to be outlines of 
the body-hieroglyphic gestures. (Irwin, p. 98) 
With the transferral of preferred signs from the oral/aural to the physiog-
nomic/pictographic, Whitman discovers the most impressive means of com-
munication he can find: "Writing and talk do not prove me, I I carry the 
plenum of proof and every thing else in my face" (11. 579-580). Not in what 
his face expresses in any linguistic sense, not in any idea which causes a facial 
expression (the latter then being a mediation, a facade, for an anterior and 
non-spatial motive), but in his countenance itself. Just as the mute face of na-
ture peremptorily interrupts Whitman's frivolity - "the look of the bay mare 
shames silliness out of me" (1. 244)-so Whitman's patient dumbness thwarts 
those who would mock him-"With the hush of my lips I wholly confound 
the skeptic" (1. 581). A mystical silence overrules language. 
But, of course, Whitman does use language and he does so in a notation 
that is never pictographic. So how does Whitman convey his personal 
physiognomy to the reader other than by proclaiming his silence (an oxy-
moron), by printing a picture of himself on the title page with no signature ( a 
genuinely pictographic sign but one which is nevertheless incomplete until 
the figure is named in Section 24), and by repeated sensualistic allusions to 
his corporeal body (references mediated nonetheless by an arbitrary, ab-
stract, bodiless sign system). Irwin offers a concise yet far-reaching explana-
tion of how Whitman's poetic strategy transmits the visible poetic self to the 
reader and renders mediation harmless. 
First, Whitman makes the poetic self the sole referent of the poem. But since the poetic selfis, 
as Whitman makes clear, a visible self-an inscribed, imaged self constituted by the poem's 
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written words-that act makes the poem its own referent. As a result, the absence of the poem's 
referent is circumvented. (p. 99) 
Placing himself (Whitman the poetic self structured in and by language, not 
Whitman the "real" man in 185515) at the core of the poem designates any-
thing not assimilated by the poet superfluous (an act which eradicates the me-
diating role imposed upon the poet by the mimetic preconception of art). 
The poet can now express himself in all his corporeality - not a world external 
to himself or a tradition not originating in himself. The reader need look no 
further for referential meaning than the all-encompassing poet whose ego-
centric, imperative commands and entreaties alert the reader to his authority 
and testify to his nearness. Since the poem's content centers around the 
poetic self, which exists only in and as the poem, "Song of Myself' achieves a 
self-referential closure without, however, becoming objectified. As opposed 
to the static, spatial form normally associated with closed, "auto-telic" , 
poems, Whitman's poem is dynamic and personal, temporal and aural, with a 
unique local subject as its ground. Irwin anticipates the objection that "Song 
of Myself," with its multifarious characters and events appearing at osten-
sibly random moments, refers to much more than the poet himself by adding 
that "in a kind of cosmic consciousness [Whitman] merges the whole 
universe into that linguistic self' (p. 99): "All these I feel or am" (Whitman, 
l. 837). Whitman's inclusive vision absorbs all experience, good and evil, 
pleasure and pain, into his ever-expanding ego. It only remains for the reader 
to accept Whitman's heartfelt invitation to join him in this blissful circle of 
creation: 
Do you not see 0 my brothers and sisters? 
It is not chaos or death. . . . it is form and union and plan. . . . 
it is eternal life .... it is happiness. (11., 1317-1318) 
To appreciate the awe-inspiring feat Whitman has performed-charit-
ably bringing poet and reader together in a self-contained poetic world that is 
nevertheless abundantly prolific and diverse-one must acknowledge the 
difficulty Whitman faces in the alienating activity of writing. To abolish the 
absences writing imposes (absence of author from reader, which causes pos-
sible misinterpretation; of author from his own creation which continues to 
function, often in ways the author never intended; of reader from repre-
sented, be it the author's conscious intention or +he reality he copies), 16 Whit-
man instills the poem with his abiding presence, giving to his writing a per-
petual liveliness surpassing his own finite earthly life. He lets the language 
guide his divergent readers to the governing referent of the poem, a converg-
ence settling upon Whitman's bodily text (a textual body, a "corpus"). 
This is Irwin's conclusion as he moves on to consider Whitman's passion 
for orality at its most impassioned: opera. What I wish to examine is Irwin's 
6 
thesis that "Song ofMyselr' exemplifies "that absence of an external referent 
beyond Whitman's 'inscribed, imaged self that we call self-referentiality" 
(p. 99). If this is true, then the poetic self stands in an unmediated relation 
(again, an oxymoron, but I know of no other way to express it) to the world of 
"Song of Myself," for the poetic self is "Song of Myself." All things in the 
poem become him and interpretation, on his part, is unnecessary. But several 
passages indicate that all signs in "Song ofMyselr' do not begin and end with 
Whitman, that the poetic self is not the sole referent. These passages imply 
that, at certain moments, Whitman's situation parallels that of the reader, for 
Whitman, h~rdly an archetypal origin or final authority, must himself"read" 
the universe before passing it on to his audience, the secondary readers. 
To me the converging objects of the universe perpetually flow, 
All are written to me and I must get what the writing means. (11. 404-405) 
I wish I could translate the hints about the dead young men and women. (1. 121) 
One might interpret these lines as signalling a decline of inspiration or the 
onset of despair that the poet will eventually surmount, but neither statement 
reveals a loss of poetic power stylistically and both appear at dramatically up-
lifting moments. Rather, I would argue that Whitman's insight into the inev-
itable intervention of writing between the universe, Whitman, "Song of 
Myself," and the reader, went hand in hand with his belief in the possibility 
of an oral presence in writing. 
Whitman's conception of himself as a reader of the universal text 
emerges in a key passage near the beginning of "Song of Myself." When a 
child asks him "What is the grass?" Whitman cannot give him a definite 
answer, implying that, given the reference to the volume's title, the reader is 
in a similar position of being unable to totalize "Song of Myself' with a defin-
itive interpretation (using an absolute referent). The answers he does give 
amount to a kind of suppositional troping activity suggesting that the univer-
sal text is pluralistic and poetic. 
I guess it must be the flag of my disposition, out of hopeful 
green stuff woven. 
Or I guess it is the handkerchief of the Lord, 
A scented gift and remembrancer designedly dropped, 
Bearing the owner's name someway in the corners, that we may 
see and remark, and say Whose? 
Or I guess the grass is itself a child. . . . the produced babe of 
the vegetation. 
Or I guess it is a uniform hieroglyphic, 
And it means, Sprouting alike in broad zones and narrow zones, 
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Growing among black folks as among white, 
Kanuck, Tuckahoe, Congressman, Cuff, I give them the same, 
I receive them the same, 
And now it seems to me the beautiful uncut hair of graves. 
Tenderly will I use you curling grass, 
It may be you transpire from the breasts of young men, 
It may be if I had known them I would have loved them; 
It may be you are from old people and from women, and from 
offspring taken soon out of their mothers' laps, 
And here you are the mothers' laps. (11. 10 1-115) 
Although Irwin notes this passage earlier in his book (p. 20), his neglect of it 
when talking about the aboriginal referent of "Song of Myself' implies that 
the critic assumes the "grass" to belong to or issue from the grand, cosmic self 
hovering over the poem. But, then, why do the "leaves" have to be read? 
Must Whitman "translate'" the "writing" of nature only because his readers 
do not yet share his unmediated vision? Perhaps this may be the case, es-
pecially considering the poem's conclusion. But I don't know if a clear choice 
can be made between viewing Whitman as the inspired bard with immediate 
access to the truth or viewing him merely as a privileged reader closer to the 
trl!th but mediated nonetheless. What is most important is that, in his will-
ingness to produce several possible tropic readings of the "uniform hiero-
glyphic," Whitman adheres to an anti-dogma that levels beliefs to the aes-
thetic plane of interpretation with the poet as inspired mediator and inter-
preter. 
II. 
And I swear I never will translate myself at all, only to him 
or her who privately stays with me in the open air. 
- Whitman, "Song of MyselP' 
For poetry was all written before time was, and whenever we are so finely organized that we 
can penetrate into that region where the air is music, we hear those primal warblings and at-
tempt to write them down, but we lose ever and anon a word or a verse and substitute some-
thing of our own, and thus miswrite the poem. 
- Emerson, "The Poet" 
I find letters from God dropped in the street and ~very one is 
signed by God's name. 
And I leave them where they are, for I know that others will 
punctually come forever and ever. 
- Whitman, "Song of MyselP' 
We know that the secret of the world is profound, but who or what shall be our interpreter, we 
know not. A mountain ramble, a new style of face, a new person, may put the key into our 
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hands. Of course the value of genius to us is in the veracity of its report. Talent may frolic and 
juggle; genius realizes and adds. 
- Emerson, "The Poet" 
"[T]he veracity of its report." But do not the additions of genius falsify 
the "report"? If the right interpreter translates God's "letters ... punctually" 
(punctuatingly?),for his community of readers gathered "in the open air," 
then the "secret of the world" is revealed by his consequent hieroglyphic (an 
authentic "priestly writing") whose verity is self-evident. But if he "lose[s] 
ever and anon a word or a verse and substituter s] something of [his] own," 
then his readers are saddeningly confronted with yet another fragmentary, 
eccentric version of the "secret." Unless, that is, the poet has privileged ac-
cess to the "secret" and his version stems immediately from it. But how does 
he convince his readers of his election into the sacred circle of prophets other 
than by'stating, as Whitman does with imposing simplicity, "There is that in 
me ... " (1. 1309)? How does the visionary prophet consecrate his language 
and accumulate an assenting audience who credits his inspiration? 
As we have seen, one way for the poet to assemble followers is through 
the incantatory, oracular power of his words, but this conclusion only begs 
the question of how language actually acquires oracular power. Other than 
rhetorical patterns (which have nothing mysterious about them), what is it 
that distinguishes prosaic, discursive language which may enlighten but does 
not elate its reader, from rhapsodic, divinely charged poetic language which 
enthralls the reader with orphic affections of presence? 
In searching for a description of Whitman's proselytizing method, 
C. Carroll Hollis, in Language and Style in "Leaves of Grass, "turns to the "or-
dinary language" philosopher John Austin's theory of speech acts. Like most 
critics, Hollis begins by noting Whitman's lifelong interest in oratory, but he 
soon moves into theoretical discussions of style, basing his arguments on 
such well-known theorists oflanguage as Searle and Jakobson as well as Aus-
tin. In relation to the present issue, Austin's terminology comes in handy-
what makes Whitman's language so effectively oracular, says Hollis, is its "il-
locutionary force." As Austin defines it, an illocutionary act is that kind ofut-
terance which performs the very act that it represents. 17 For example, when 
the queen says "I christen this ship the Queen Elizabeth" and then smashes a 
champagne bottle against the ship's prow, her statement is an integral part of 
the act of christening, not merely a statement about the christening. Because 
saying and doing are united in illocutionary acts, language's usual role as the 
outward representation of action is ruled out. Language itself becomes 
active, alive, capable of working rather than simply imitating work. 
Besides obviating the mediating status of language (as it functions in 
representaton) by making language performative, illocutionary acts also 
presuppose a cooperative, familiar relationship between speaker and listener. 
Austin's "felicity rules" (behavioral conventions that render possible and suc-
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cessful an illocutionary act) state that "(B. 1 ) The procedure must be executed 
by both participants both correctly and (B.2) completely" (p. 15). In other 
words, the two parties must fulfill prescribed expectations for an illocu-
tionary act to be complete. Thus, in illocutionary contexts, language func-
tions as a contractual vehicle unifying speaker and listener in a shared ex-
perience. Just as illocutionary acts merge language and action by making the 
saying of something the doing of something, so they also merge speaker and 
listener by involving at least two people in their performative requirements. 
With "the immediacy of present-time involvement and the inclusion of the 
audience addressed" (Hollis, p. 83), illocutionary acts provide Whitman with 
a stylistic channel open to the prophetic force he wishes to convey in his 
poetry. 
Whitman resorts to an illocutionary mode, then, because it joins the 
speaker of the language, the referent of the language, and the receiver of the 
language, together in a (in the case of "Song of Myself') fervent, reverber-
ating "barbaric yawp" executing and embodying Whitman's visionary de-
sires. To prove Whitman's widespread illocutionary practice in the early 
poetry, Hollis uses Searle's taxonomy of performative statements (which re-
fine Austin's labels into "assertives,» "directives,» "commissives,» "expres-
sives," and "declaratives")18 and provides numerous passages from "Song of 
Myself' that exemplify each category. Through a scrupulous grammatical 
study of Whitman's syntax (especially his verbs) and rhetorical figures, sup-
ported by statistical counts, Hollis makes a firm, compelling case for Whit-
man's illocutionary technique. But when Hollis concludes his stylistic dis-
cussion and begins to examine the theoretical implications of finding speech 
acts in' literature, he runs up against a problem Austin wisely avoided: what 
happens when an illocutionary act is written down, particularly in a literary 
context? Do the "felicity rules" which validate a performative speech act still 
apply to or are they broken by performative "written acts"? 
Ifwe begin with Austin, the answer is "No" -illocution is not a quality of 
literary language . 
. . . a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an 
actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy. (p. 22) 
Because he merely transmits someone else's already performed illocutionary 
act (granting that literary creation may be conceived in this way), an actor's 
words have no immediate illocutionary force. And in a poem, where "the nor-
mal conditions of reference may be suspended, or no attempt made at a stan-
dard perlocutionary act, no attempt to make you do anything, as Walt Whit-
man does not seriously incite the eagle of liberty to soar" (Austin, p. 104), il-
locutionary force also dissolves, for the listeners, acknowledging the 
fictionality and "insincerity" of poetry instead of becoming coacting par-
ticipants, become disinterested spectators with no compulsion to act. And in 
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soliloquy (which characterizes all writing), the perlocutionary element of the 
speech act-the effect it immediately has upon an audience-disappears 
altogether. To Austin, written poetry has little to do with speech acts. 19 
Literary criticism has accepted Austin's challenge and addressed the 
possibility of using speech act theory to analyze poems. Hollis tries to rescue 
poetry from Austin's exclusion by referring to Richard Ohmann's essay 
"Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature,"2o a forthright attempt to 
define literary language using a speech act terminology. Hollis considers 
Ohmann's argument the most significant effort at conjoining analytic 
philosophy, which prides itself on its dismissal of literary discourse, and 
literary studies. Despite Austin's warning, Ohmann does formulate a defini-
tion ofliterature using illocutionary concepts (a definition, strangely enough, 
Austin would have approved of): 
I am ready to set down the first approximation of a definition: a literary work is a discourse 
abstracted, or detached, from the circumstances and conditions which make illocutionary acts pos-
sible; hence it is a discourse without illocutionary force. (p. 13) 
Ohmann prefaces his definition by enumerating the "circumstances and con-
ditions" necessary to illocution which are absent from literary contexts: 1) the 
lack ofa specified, unambiguous speaker-is it the author who is speaking or 
merely a projected persona whom the author may judge ironically?; 2) the 
lack of an explicit, manifest referent - are these actual experiences or existent 
things the speaker is reporting or do they exist only in his fancy?; 3) the lack 
ofa transparent, satisfactory language-tropes such as irony, metaphor, sym-
bol, and so on, disrupt the denotative functions of language and require 
reconstruction by the reader in order for them to represent properly; and 
4) the lack of a limited, established audience who responds according to the 
desired perlocutionary act-along with his sympathetic, admiring readers, 
Whitman also has cynical readers, who reject him, and smug readers, who 
parody him. And so, as opposed to the genuine illocutionary act which in-
volves a willful personality with obvious intentions, an identifiable referent 
submitted to predication in a straightforward, unequivocal language, and a 
knowing listener, a literary context involves an ambivalent persona with dis-
guised intentions, a fictional referent constructed out of an oblique, figur-
ative language, and, in general, an alien (culturally and historically) audience. 
With these shifting conditions of communicability, literature tends to de-
stabilize the contextual requirements of an illocutionary act. 
This conclusion, based upon the mediations imposed by writing, coun-
teracts Hollis's reading of Whitman, leaving one guessing as to why Hollis 
appeals to Ohmann for theoretical support. Ohmann expressly defines litera-
ture as that unique "conventional setting" (p. 9) which excludes the illocu-
tionary aspects of its sentences. Hollis distinguishes Whitman's poetry 
(which he openly reveres, as do I) categorically for its illocutionary force. Oh-
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mann, however, modifies his definition one page later with an addendum 
which means "literature does not have to be rejected" (Hollis, p. 76) and ren-
ders his argument serviceable to Hollis. 
Let me supplement the definition: A literary work is a discourse whose sentences lack the illocu-
tionary forces that would normally attach to them. Its illocutionary force is mimetic. (Ohmann, 
p.14) 
In other words, literature is not an illocutionary act-it imitates an illocu-
tionary act. Despite Austin's claim that "Language in such [literary] circum-
stances is in special ways- intelligibly-used not seriously" (p. 22), and hence 
breaks a "felicity rule," literature can still represent a performative act. It can 
signify an illocutionary motive which induces the "reader to imagine a 
speaker, a situation, a set of ancillary events, and so on" (Ohmann, p. 14), 
even though they have no eventful existence beyond the printed page. With 
this qualification, then, speech act theory can be applied to literature and 
Hollis's implementation of it is justified. 
But representing an illocutionary act brings about the mitigation of its 
original illocutionary force (Austin distinguishes "force," which is imme-
diate, from "sense and reference," which are representational, on page 100). 
Illocutionary force proceeds spontaneously out of a particular situation 
hemmed in by the conditions of presence (of speaker to listener to referent). 
Sunder the conventional requirements by detaching the utterance from its 
natural setting and placing it in a fictional context21 and the act itselfbecomes 
fictional and groundless. Without a "real," natural context (although one de-
termined by convention) to guarantee a "serious" speaker and to ensure a de-
sired response, illocutionary force, in literature, becomes merely an empty, 
impotent abstraction. Illocutionary acts are those which lose their meaning 
in representation. 
The necessary representationality of illocution in literature, with the 
consequent loss of force, added to the other attenuations I have mentioned-
the absence of a real "I," a present, sincere "utterance-orzgin" (Austin, p. 60); 
the absence of a specified, appropriate audience to complete the act; and the 
absence of a proximate, circumscribed referent understood by both parties-
forfends the qualification of any literature as illocutionary. The separations 
and distances of written discourse, the mediations inherent in the writing and 
reading processes, tend to rob language of its immediate power, oracular or 
otherwise. What Whitman wanted most he could not have. And he knew it. 
For "Song of Myself" ends not with a mystical joining of speaker and listener 
but with an anticipation of "form and union and plan" finally realized ... 
well, "somewhere" - but not in the writing. 
The University of CalzJornia, Los Angeles 
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NOTES 
Chapter 2 of In Re Walt Whitman, "Walt Whitman and His Poems," contains reviews of 
the first edition of Leaves of Grass written anonymously by Whitman himself. A short sample 
of his prose reveals how Whitman wished to be understood. 
An American Bard at last! (p. 13) 
... his voice bringing hope and prophecy to the generous 
races of young and old. (p. 13) 
. . . talking like a man unaware that there was ever hitherto 
such a production as a book, or such a being as a writer. (p. 14) 
If in this poem the United States have found their poetic 
voice . . . (p. 21) 
These passages, some of which are quoted by Hollis, indicate Whitman's desire to be heard, 
not simply read. See In Re, edited by his literary executors, Horace L. Traubel, Richard 
Maurice Bucke, and Thomas B. Harned. Folcroft Library Edition, 1973 (first published, 
Philadelphia: David McKay, 1893), pp. 13-21. 
2 Selecting a time period at random, I counted 13 entries from 1970-1974 whose titles refer 
specifically to "voice" or "song." See Donald D. Kummings, Walt Whitman, 1940-1975: A 
Reference Guide (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1982). 
3 Two early biographical studies are Lionel Crocker's "Walt Whitman's Interest in Public 
Speaking," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 26 (December, 1940), 657-667; and F.O. 
Matthiesson's chapter on "Oratory" in American Renaissance (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1941). 
4 Examples of this type are M. L. Rosenthal's "Music of Awareness: Association and Feel-
ing," in Poetry and the Common Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); and D. R. 
Jarvis's "Whitman and Speech-Based Prosody," Walt Whitman Review, 27 (June, 1981), 
51-62. 
5 John T. Irwin, American Hieroglyphics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Calvin 
Bedient, "Orality and Power (Whitman's 'Song of Myself)," Delta: Revue de Centre d'Etudes et 
de Recherche sur les Ecrivains du Sud aux Etats-Unis, 16 (May, 1983), 79-94; C. Carroll Hollis, 
Language and Style in "Leaves of Grass" (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1983). 
6' For example, Donald Kummings, "Whitman's Voice in 'Song of Myself: From Private to 
Public," Walt Whitman Review, 17 (March, 1971), 10-16; Galway Kinnell, "Whitman's In-
dicative Words," American Poetry Review, 2 (March-April, 1973), 9-10; C. Carroll Hollis, 
"Rhetoric, Elocution, and Voice in Leaves of Grass," Walt Whitman Quarterly Review, 2 (Fall, 
1984), 1-27. 
7 All Whitman quotations are taken from Leaves of Grass: A Textual Van·orum of the Printed 
Poems, 3 vols. Edited by Sculley Bradley et al. (New York: New York University Press, 1980). 
I have quoted the 1855 versions. 
8 These lines were deleted after 1871. Originally, they appear between lines 360 and 361. 
13 
9 I take my usage of "presence" from Derrida's complex definition of it as the "transcendental 
signified" governing the play of signifiers and acting as their ultimate referent. See Of Gram-
matologyJ translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1974), p.12; also, Writing and DifferenceJ translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: Univer-
.sity of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 278-280. 
10 This line, deleted after 1856, appears between lines 874 and 875. 
11 Whitman's familiarity with books on oratory and rhetoric has been revealed by both 
Hollis and William L. Finkel in "Walt Whitman's Manuscript Notes on Oratory," American 
LiteratureJ 22 (March, 1950), 29-53. 
12 The book Irwin quotes from is Weinberg's The First Three Minutes: A Modern View of the 
Origin of the Universe (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
13 I am not arguing that science does not improve upon itself or that the progress of 
knowledge in history is merely one of one interpretation supplanting another without any sig-
nificant advance toward ''truth.'' I only wish to point out that modern physics must confront 
mediation just as the literary critic does. 
14 From "So Long" (11. 53-54, 1860 edition). 
15 None of the critics I am discussing naively assumes the speaker of the poem is anything 
more than a linguistically constructed persona who strongly asserts a personality. 
16 One elaborate theoretical discussion of literature and mediation is Murray Krieger's 
"Mediation, Language, and Vision in the Reading of Literature," in Poetic Presence and Illusion 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 
17 John Austin, How to Do Things With Word\'. 2nd edition, edited by J. O. Urmson and 
Marina Sbisa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
18 John Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 12-17. 
19 Austin writes of poetic language, "These references to 'use oflanguage' have nothing to do 
with the illocutionary act" (p. 104). 
20 The essay appears in Philosophy and RhetoricJ 4 (Winter, 1971), 1-19. 
21 On the distinction between "natural discourse" and "fictive discourse," see Barbara Herrn-
stein Smith's On the Margins of Discourse, The Relation of Literature to Language (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
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